CASE COMMENTARIES
ARBITRATION
The Federal Arbitration Act supersedes state law when a contract provides for
arbitration of all claims. Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978 (2008).
By Christie M. Weaver
A conflict can arise between arbitration clauses and state laws that assign
jurisdiction of a particular issue to a judicial or administrative forum. In Preston v.
Ferrer, the Supreme Court held that when parties contractually agree to arbitration,
the Federal Arbitration Act (―FAA‖) overrides any state law that assigns primary
jurisdiction to another arena.
Arnold M. Preston (―Preston‖) and Alex E. Ferrer (―Ferrer‖) entered into a
contract (the ―Contract‖) whereby Preston, a California-based entertainment
attorney, would render legal services to Ferrer, a former Florida trial court judge who
appeared as ―Judge Alex‖ on a television program of the same name. The Contract
allowed for arbitration of any dispute arising from ―the terms of [the Contract] or
the breach, validity, or legality thereof.‖ Preston invoked the arbitration clause and
submitted the case to the American Arbitration Association (―AAA‖) seeking fees
allegedly due to him under the Contract. Ferrer challenged the validity of the
contract under the California Talent Agencies Act (―TAA‖), claiming that Preston
illegally acted as a talent agent. The TAA provided that disputes be referred to the
California Labor Commissioner; thus, a conflict emerged between state law and the
terms of the Contract‘s arbitration clause. Ferrer filed suit in state court requesting
an injunction to postpone arbitration and seeking a determination that the
controversy was not subject to review by an arbitrator. Preston moved to enforce
the arbitration clause, asserting that he acted as a ―personal manager‖ and not as a
talent agent as defined by the TAA. The California Superior Court partially granted
Ferrer‘s request, enjoining arbitration until the Labor Commissioner accepted
jurisdiction over the dispute. While Preston‘s appeal was pending, the Supreme
Court decided Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), holding that
an arbitratornot the state courtmust decide whether a contract containing an
arbitration clause was illegal. The California Court of Appeal found that Buckeye was
inapplicable to the Preston case and affirmed the lower court‘s decision, holding that
the TAA vested exclusive jurisdiction with the Labor Commissioner. Preston‘s
petition for review was denied by the California Supreme Court, but the United
States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari. The sole question before the
Supreme Court was whether the California Labor Commissioner or an arbitrator
105
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would determine if Preston acted as a personal manager or a talent agent.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the California Court of Appeal,
holding that the FAA preempts state law when parties agree to arbitrate disputes
arising from a contract. Section 2 of the FAA sets forth a national policy favoring
arbitration by providing that an agreement to settle disputes by arbitration in a
contract ―shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable‖ unless the entire contract is
void. In contrast, the TAA authorized arbitration of disputes only if both parties
agreed to participate and allowed the Labor Commissioner to be present. The Court
found that TAA procedures conflicted with the FAA in two respects: first, the TAA
gave the Labor Commissioner exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute that the parties
agreed to arbitrate; and second, the TAA‘s prerequisites to enforcement of an
arbitration agreement contradicted the legislative intent that disputes be resolved
quickly.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the California Court of Appeal‘s
determination that Buckeye was inapposite because it did not involve an administrative
agency and found the Buckeye decision to be controlling. Ferrer attempted to
differentiate the case by asserting that the TAA merely delayed arbitration, as
opposed to the state court‘s outright prohibition of arbitration in Buckeye. In
rejecting this argument, the Court explained that arbitration would likely be long
delayed if the dispute initially went before the Labor Commissioner, which is
contradictory to Congress‘s intent to expedite alternative dispute resolution.
Additionally, the Court believed Ferrer would not surrender substantive rights
afforded to him by the TAA or California law if the dispute was directed to
arbitration. The Court could find no reason to distinguish Buckeye, where
adjudicatory authority was vested in a state court, from Preston, where an
administrative agency was given jurisdiction. Accordingly, state laws that allow for
administrative review prior to arbitration are preempted by the FAA, as are state laws
that divert the dispute to an initial court review.
The Preston decision is an important endorsement of the FAA‘s stated
―federal policy favoring arbitration‖ and reinforces that the FAA preempts
contradictory state laws. Transactional attorneys negotiating contracts must consider
the impact of the FAA if parties agree to arbitrate disputes, especially in industries
where individuals may rely upon specialized and administrative agencies to protect
their rights. Further, the states‘ ability to monitor and regulate those industries could
be threatened by precursory submission of disputes to an arbitrator. In light of
Preston, parties to a contract will be able to avoid administrative adjudication in favor
of arbitration, but may also risk surrendering protections offered by state statutes
and agencies that are preempted by the FAA.
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BUSINESS LITIGATION
LLCs can be found for the purpose of venue where their registered agent
maintains an office. Fed. Express v. Am. Bicycle Group, LLC., No. E207-01483-COAR9-CV, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 80, 2008 WL 565687 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19,
2008).
By Bryan C. Hathorn
A transitory action is an action that can be brought wherever personal service
of process can be made on the defendant, as opposed to a local action, which must
be brought where the subject matter of the controversy exists. Multiple possible
venues exist for transitory actions in Tennessee. Tennessee Code Annotated § 24-4101(a) provides that the proper venue for a transitory action is ―where the cause of
action arose or where the [d]efendant resides or is found.‖1 In Federal Express v.
American Bicycle Group, LLC, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that, for the
purpose of determining venue, an LLC can be found at the location of its registered
agent and office.
Federal Express (the ―Plaintiff ‖) filed a complaint against The American
Bicycle Group, LLC (the ―Defendant‖) in Knox County Chancery Court. The
summons was served on the Defendant‘s registered agent located in Knox County.
The Defendant moved to dismiss the case for improper venue. The Defendant
asserted that the Knox County venue was improper because the transitory action
arose in Shelby County and the Defendant‘s place of business was in Hamilton
County. The Plaintiff responded that for the purpose of venue, the Defendant was
found in Knox County because its registered agent was in Knox County. The trial
court denied the motion, and the Defendant made an interlocutory appeal to the
Court of Appeals to determine if the Knox County venue was permitted.
Corporations can be found in counties where they have an ―office, agency or
resident director.‖2 Although LLCs are not incorporated, Tennessee courts often
apply corporate law to LLCs. Thus, an LLC can be found in any county where it

When the plaintiff and the defendant both reside in the same county, the ―common county‖
exception to this rule provides that the action can only be brought where the cause of action arose or
in the common county of residence, eliminating the venue where the defendant is ―found.‖
1

2

Redman v. DuPont Rayon Co., 56 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tenn. 1933).
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maintains ―an office for furtherance of its business activities.‖3
Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-208-101 provides that an LLC must have a
registered office and a registered agent in the state, and that the ―registered agent
must maintain a business office that is identical with the registered office.‖
Moreover, under Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-208-102, if the LLC changes its
registered office or registered agent, ―the street address of its registered office and
the business office of its registered agent will be identical.‖ Thus, the registered
agent must maintain a business office at the LLC‘s registered office. Because an LLC
can be found at a business office, it can be found at the location of its registered
agent and office.
The Defendant‘s registered agent maintained its business office at a street
address in Knox County. As such, the court found that the Defendant had a
business office in Knox County and was found there for the purpose of venue in a
transitory action.
The court‘s decision reaffirms that the appropriate venues for a plaintiff to
bring a transitory action against an LLC or corporation in Tennessee are (i) where
the cause of action arose, (ii) where the defendant does business (i.e., where it
resides), and (iii) where it maintains a business office (i.e., where it can be found—
including the location of its registered agent and office). A plaintiff may bring an action in
any of these venues.
As a result, an LLC must defend a lawsuit in any venue where the LLC has a
registered agent and office. As a practical matter, if an LLC wishes to avoid a
particular venue, it is necessary to avoid being found there. While an LLC may not
be able to eliminate a place of business in an unfavorable venue, it is possible to
choose the location of the LLC‘s registered agent and office.
When counseling an LLC, Tennessee attorneys should advise the LLC that it
will be required to defend a civil action anywhere that the LLC maintains a registered
agent and office. If an LLC already has its registered agent and office in a venue
where it does not wish to appear, it can change the location of its registration. The
procedure for doing so is provided by Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-208-102 (b).
To change its registered agent and office, the LLC must deliver to the secretary of
state a statement which provides the name of the LLC, the name and address of the
current registered agent and office, and the name and address of the new registered
3

Garland v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 658 S.W.2d 528, 534 (Tenn. 1983).
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agent and office. After changing the location of its registered agent and office, the
LLC will only be found for the purpose of venue either where it has its new
registered agent or where it maintains business offices. However, suit can still be
brought where an action arose.
CONTRACT LAW
A party cannot enforce an ambiguous contract provision where the party
knew or should have known that the other party had a substantially different
interpretation of that provision. United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc., 937 A.2d
810 (Del. Ch. 2007).
By Christopher M. Smith
When a contract provision is ambiguous, the Delaware Court of Chancery
will use extrinsic evidence to find an objectively reasonable interpretation. If the
extrinsic evidence plausibly suggests two reasonable interpretations, the court will
construe the provision in light of the ―forthright negotiator principle,‖ which looks
at ―the subjective understanding of one party that has been objectively manifested
and is known or should be known by the other party.‖ Under this principle, the
court will not enforce an ambiguous provision where one party knew or should have
known of the other party‘s differing interpretation of that provision.
The directors of United Rentals, Inc. (―URI‖), a multi-billion dollar
equipment rental company, solicited bids for a leveraged buyout of the company.
Investment group Cerberus Capital Management, L.P. (―Cerberus‖), entered into
negotiations to buy the company. To limit its potential liability, Cerberus created the
shell corporations RAM Holdings, Inc. and RAM Acquisition Corp. (collectively
―RAM‖) to merge with URI. Because RAM had practically no assets, Cerberus used
one of its investment funds to guarantee RAM‘s obligations to URI. Although they
operated in different states, all entities were incorporated under Delaware law.
The parties negotiated the merger for months and sent nine drafts back and
forth before reaching the final Merger Agreement (―Agreement‖). Throughout
negotiations, the parties fundamentally disagreed on URI‘s remedies in the event that
RAM (i.e., Cerberus) backed out of the merger. RAM maintained that URI‘s sole
remedy in the event of breach was a $100 million ―termination fee‖ constituting
liquidated damages. In contrast, URI wanted the right to demand specific
performance of RAM‘s obligations under the Agreement, but was unclear in
communicating that requirement to RAM. The Agreement itself contained two
contradictory provisions regarding URI‘s remedies: the first provision granted URI
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the right to ―enforce specifically the terms and provisions of this Agreement,‖
subject to the second provision, which stated that the termination fee was the ―sole
and exclusive remedy . . . and in no event shall [URI] seek equitable relief . . . from
[RAM or Cerberus].‖
RAM backed out of the merger, admitting that it breached the Agreement
but maintaining that it was only liable for the $100 million termination fee. URI
argued that a plain reading of the Agreement expressly protected the ―right to
specific performance‖ subject to the ―sole and exclusive remedy‖ language. URI
maintained that the breach was not a ―termination‖ (a defined term in the contract)
that would give rise to the $100 million termination fee, but rather a breach allowing
for the remedy of specific performance. RAM, on the other hand, argued that it
expressly rejected URI‘s right to specific performance through the second provision,
just as it had forcefully rejected that remedy in previous drafts and negotiations.
The Delaware Court of Chancery denied URI‘s petition for specific
performance because URI knew or should have known that RAM interpreted the
ambiguous provisions to preclude the remedy of specific performance. Because the
contractual provisions were ambiguous, the court looked at extrinsic evidence found
in Agreement drafts, notes of meetings, and witnesses‘ recollections of discussions.
When extrinsic evidence offered no ―obvious‖ objective interpretation and each
party offered a different reasonable interpretation, the court utilized the ―forthright
negotiator principle‖ to settle the meaning of the ambiguous provisions. Under this
principle, the court focused on how effectively each party had communicated its
understanding of the Agreement to the other party. The court held that ―URI knew
or should have known what Cerberus‘s understanding of the Merger Agreement was,
and if URI disagreed with that understanding, it had an affirmative duty to clarify its
position in the face of an ambiguous contract with glaringly conflicting provisions.‖
The court relied chiefly on evidence that RAM had repeatedly and forcefully
insisted through draft edits and oral communication that URI‘s only remedy was the
$100 million termination fee. In contrast, URI‘s negotiating attorney wavered on the
issue and seemingly acquiesced to RAM‘s interpretation: ―Testimony indicated that
[URI‘s attorney] put up no fight on this issue.‖ In response to RAM‘s
uncompromising stance, he ―replied, ‗I get it.‘‖ In doing so, he ―categorically failed
to communicate‖ URI‘s understanding of its right to specific performance.
The lawsuit could have been avoided if RAM had deleted the specific
performance provision rather than making it ―subject to‖ the termination fee
provision. The court noted that while Delaware law allows for such hierarchical
organization of contract provisions, simply deleting the specific performance
language would have been the superior and ―seemingly obvious‖ approach. Instead,
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both sides allowed the ambiguity to remain in the Agreement.
Citing one of Judge Richard Posner‘s articles on law and economics, the
court acknowledged that a certain amount of ambiguity is sometimes necessary to
close a deal. In United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc, however, the ambiguity
resulted in an expensive lawsuit without the possibility of summary judgment
because a material fact was in dispute. In addition, although it ultimately won the
lawsuit, Cerberus paid a reputational cost. After noting ―the importance of
reputation in the private equity field,‖ the court criticized Cerberus for ―walking away
from this deal, for favoring their lenders over their targets, [and] for suboptimal
contract drafting‖ and quoted a New York Times article calling Cerberus ―the
ultimate flighty, hot-tempered partner.‖
For transactional attorneys, this decision illustrates two principles of contract
negotiation and drafting: First, and especially in transactions with numerous contract
drafts, it is far better to delete an obsolete provision than to attempt to nullify it by
making it ―subject to‖ a separate provision. Contradictory provisions create
ambiguity, and ambiguity allows the court to consider extrinsic evidence. Second, at
all stages of negotiation, a transactional attorney should be forthright, clear, and
relentless in advocating his client‘s interpretation of provisions and his client‘s goals.
Mixed messages may lead to trouble, especially where the court utilizes the
―forthright negotiator principle‖ to resolve ambiguous provisions.
―――――
In Tennessee, contractual provisions intended to shift attorney’s fees must
include the term “attorney’s fees.” Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. v. Epperson,
No. M2006-02424-COA-R3-CV, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129, 2008 WL 596174
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2008).
By Ryan Hoffman
Prevailing litigants often incur substantial expenses in the form of attorney‘s
fees. In Tennessee and other jurisdictions that follow the traditional American rule,
litigants must pay their own attorney‘s fees absent a statute or contract that provides
otherwise. When a prevailing party in a contractual dispute seeks to recovery
attorney‘s fees, courts must determine whether the contracting parties intended that
the prevailing party be entitled to recover attorney‘s fees from the breaching party.
In Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. v. Epperson, the Tennessee Court of Appeals
held that a declaration of easements and restrictions that provided that all ―costs and
expenses‖ of any suit arising from a violation of the declaration would be assessed
against the defaulting party did not provide for recovery of attorney‘s fees.

112

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 10

Cracker Barrel v. Epperson concerned a Declaration of Reciprocal Rights and
Easement and Restrictive Covenants (the ―Declaration‖) involving neighboring
properties owned by Cracker Barrel and Richard Epperson and Timothy Causey (the
―Defendants‖). Paragraph nine of the Declaration stated that the agreement created
mutual benefits and servitudes that ran with the land, and that if an owner violated
the declaration‘s provisions, any party with an interest in the property was entitled to
legal and equitable remedies. Paragraph nine stated: ―All costs and expenses of any
suit or proceeding shall be assessed against the defaulting party.‖
Cracker Barrel initiated suit against the Defendants, claiming that their plan
to expand a building violated the Declaration. In its complaint, Cracker Barrel
sought attorney‘s fees, a request that also appeared in the Defendants‘ counterclaim.
The trial court found that the expansion plan violated the Declaration and issued an
agreed judgment and permanent injunction in January 2006. This judgment
provided that Cracker Barrel could renew its motion for an award of ―Plaintiff ‘s
attorneys‘ fees, costs and expenses incurred in connection with obtaining [the]
Permanent Injunction‖ if the parties were unable to resolve their dispute through
nonbinding mediation. After the parties failed to settle the dispute, the trial court
awarded Cracker Barrel court costs, but found that the Declaration did not provide
for an award of attorney‘s fees.
The sole issue raised on Cracker Barrel‘s appeal was whether the trial court
properly denied Cracker Barrel‘s request for attorney‘s fees. The Tennessee Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court, holding that no language in the
Declaration compelled the Defendants to pay Cracker Barrel‘s attorney‘s fees. The
court concluded that Tennessee follows the American rule, which requires parties to
pay their own attorney‘s fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise or there
is some equitable basis for awarding attorney‘s fees. Additionally, the court noted
that an award of attorney‘s fees, absent one of the above exceptions, is against public
policy in Tennessee.
The American rule does not apply when parties to a contract agree to a fee
shifting provision. According to the majority in Cracker Barrel v. Epperson, Tennessee
case-law supports the presumption that contracting parties do not intend to deviate
from the American rule unless a contract ―specifically provid[es]‖ for the recovery of
attorney‘s fees. Thus, the court reasoned that the drafter of the Declaration could
have ―specifically‖ or ―expressly‖ provided that the prevailing party in an
enforcement action may recover attorney‘s fees. Because the Declaration did not
specifically provide for the shifting of ―attorney‘s fees,‖ the court refused to interpret
the phrase ―costs and expenses‖ as encompassing attorney‘s fees. Based on
Tennessee‘s adherence to the American rule, public policy considerations, and the
lack of express language unequivocally shifting attorney‘s fees, the majority denied
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Cracker Barrel‘s request for attorney‘s fees.
The dissent argued that the majority‘s construction of the American rule was
too strict. According to the dissent, Tennessee allows recovery of attorney‘s fees
―under an express contract ‗if the language of the agreement is broad enough to
cover such expenditures.‘‖
The dissent argued that the phrase ―all costs and
expenses of any suit or proceeding‖ was broad enough to include attorney‘s fees.
Conversely, the majority focused on the phrase ―costs and expenses‖ and disregarded
the preceding word, ―all,‖ in declining to award attorney‘s fees. Yet, attorney‘s fees
are certainly either a ―cost‖ (although they are distinguished from court costs) or
―expense‖ associated with a lawsuit. Since the Declaration provided that ―all costs
and expenses‖ shifted to the defaulting party, it is not difficult to imagine that the
contracting parties contemplated the payment of attorney‘s fees at the Declaration‘s
formation. The majority, however, determined that this language did not constitute
an ―express‖ and ―specific‖ manifestation of the contracting parties‘ intent as
required under Tennessee law.
The court‘s message in Cracker Barrel v. Epperson is clear: parties to contract
must explicitly provide for the shifting of ―attorney‘s fees‖ if they wish to recover
such fees. Contract drafters should be mindful of this requirement. In addition,
attorneys may find it necessary to modify pre-existing fee-shifting agreements to
conform to the explicit language required in Cracker Barrel v. Epperson.
EMPLOYMENT LAW
Defined contribution benefit plan participants are entitled to recovery for
fiduciary breaches under ERISA § 502(a)(2). LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs.,
128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008).
By Melissa Hughes
The growing popularity of retirement security plans administered by a
participant‘s employer has resulted in confusion regarding legal liability when such
plans are mismanaged. Over twenty years ago, the United States Supreme Court
held that a participant in a fixed benefit disability plan did not have a separate cause
of action under § 502(a)(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(―ERISA‖), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1974), for injury to the participant‘s individual
account. The Supreme Court recently reexamined its previous decision and held
that, in the case of defined contribution employee benefit plans, an individual
claiming breach of fiduciary duty does have standing to bring suit under § § 502(a)(2)
for injuries distinct from the entire plan.
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As an employee at DeWolff, Boberg & Associates (―DeWolff ‖), James LaRue
contributed to an ERISA-regulated 401(k) retirement savings plan administered by
DeWolff. This type of retirement plan, categorized as a ―defined contribution plan‖
or an ―individual account plan,‖ operates by investing a participant‘s contributions, so
that, at the point of retirement, the participant will receive the value of the individual
account. The value of the account is determined by the financial success of the
invested contributions. While defined contribution plans are more popular in recent
years, ―defined benefit plans‖ were once the standard type employee benefit plan.
Unlike the defined contribution plan, a defined benefit plan uses the participant‘s
years of service and quantity of compensation to calculate a fixed level of retirement
income to which the participant is entitled.
In 2004, LaRue filed suit against DeWolff, alleging that DeWolff failed to
follow LaRue‘s directions to make certain changes on his individual 401(k) account.
LaRue claimed that DeWolff ‘s mismanagement, which depleted $150,000 from
LaRue‘s interest, was a breach of the fiduciary duty owed under ERISA § 409(a).
Although § 502(a) of ERISA provides six ways in which various parties and
individuals may bring a civil cause of action, LaRue chose to assert claims under
§ 502(a)(2) and § 502(a)(3). The district court denied LaRue‘s original claim under
§ 502(a)(3) and granted DeWolff ‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The
district court concluded that Plaintiff sought money damages rather than the
equitable relief available under § 502(a)(3).
LaRue appealed to the Third Circuit, this time asserting a claim under both
§ 502(a)(2) and § 502(a)(3). Under § 502(a)(2), the Secretary of Labor, plan
participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries are authorized to bring an action ―on
behalf of a plan‖ to recover for violations provided in § 409(a) of ERISA, which
subjects fiduciaries who breach any responsibility, obligation or duty imposed by
statute to personal liability. In denying the § 502(a)(2) claim, the Third Circuit relied
on an older Supreme Court decision, Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co v. Russell,
473 U.S. 134 (1985). In Russell, an individual participant of a defined benefit plan
sought recovery under § 502(a)(2) for damages resulting from her employer‘s delay in
processing her claim. The Supreme Court rejected the participant‘s right to bring an
individual claim, holding that § 502(a)(2) provided a remedy only for injury to the
entire plan and not for distinct participant injuries.
Applying the Supreme Court‘s rationale in Russell, the Third Circuit denied
LaRue‘s claim under § 502(a)(2). The Third Circuit classified LaRue‘s remedy as
―personal‖ and held that his ―remedial interest‖ was unable to ―serve as a legitimate
proxy for the plan in its entirety.‖ In addition to rejecting LaRue‘s § 502(a)(2) claim,
the Third Circuit also denied his argument under § 502(a)(3).
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The Supreme Court granted LaRue‘s writ of certiorari for the sole purpose
of addressing the Third Circuit‘s interpretation of § 502(a)(2). The Supreme Court
distinguished Russell and held that although § 502(a)(2) does not offer relief for
individual injury different from injury to the entire plan, § 502(a)(2) does offer relief
for breaches of fiduciary duty that harms an individual participant‘s plan assets. In
making this distinction, the Supreme Court declared that the ―former landscape of
employee benefit plans . . . has changed.‖ At the time of ERISA‘s enactment, the
predominant type of employee benefit plan was the defined benefit plan formerly at
issue in Russell. A participant in a defined benefit plan does not acquire an individual
account. Rather, at the time of retirement the participant receives a fixed benefit
amount based on the percentage of salary formerly received. As explained by the
Supreme Court, the holding in Russell ―speaks to the impact of § 409 on plans that
pay defined benefits.‖ With defined benefit plans, an administrator‘s violation of
ERISA would not affect an individual participant‘s benefits without also affecting the
plan as a whole. The Supreme Court recognized that for defined benefit plans,
fiduciary misconduct would not create participant injury distinct and separate from
injury to the entire plan. Thus, the need for an available cause of action to individual
participants was unnecessary, because bringing suit on behalf of the plan as a whole
would serve the ultimate concern in passing ERISA, to prevent ―misuse and
mismanagement of plan assets by plan administrators.‖
In the modern economy, defined contribution plans are more predominant
than defined benefit plans. Unlike defined benefit plans, fiduciary misconduct
involving a defined contribution plan can threaten participants‘ individual interests
without causing harm to the entire plan. Because the benefit received under a
defined contribution plan is largely the result of the performance of invested
contributions, a participant can stand to gain or lose without affecting the entire
plan. Relying on this distinction, the Supreme Court decided that its holding in
Russell, which allowed a cause of action only if the injury is to the ―entire plan,‖ was
limited to defined benefit plans. On the other hand, a participant in a defined
contribution plan is entitled to recovery for harm to the value of the participant‘s
individual plan as a result of fiduciary misconduct. Accordingly, LaRue had a
cognizable breach of fiduciary duty claim under ERISA § 502(a)(2) for the alleged
injury to his 401(k) interest because he claimed injury to his individual defined
contribution plan.
In practice, an attorney should consider the possible liability a client might be
subject to while managing, or choosing another entity to manage, a defined
contribution plan as opposed to a defined benefit plan. A transactional attorney
should advise an employer-client to consider the interests and suggestions of the
employee and the expected success of plan management decisions before making
any changes to the plan. The potential liability of failure to make certain changes
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should also be discussed with an employer-client. Poor administration of employees‘
requests to change their defined contribution plans can result in a breach of fiduciary
duty and significant liability.
―――――
A principal must notify third parties of limitations on a general agent’s
authority to avoid liability for actions taken under the agent’s apparent
authority. BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Primary Residential Mortgage, Inc., No.
M2007-00200-COA-R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 841, 2008 WL 624846 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2008).
By George Green
If a general agent exceeds his actual authority, the principal remains liable for
any action taken by the agent within the scope of the agent‘s apparent authority. In
BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Primary Residential Mortgage, Inc., the
Tennessee Court of Appeals held that a principal‘s failure to disclose a general
agent‘s authoritative limitations to a third party is sufficient to establish that party‘s
good faith belief in the agent‘s apparent authority.
Craig Daliesso (―Daliesso‖) was the branch manager for Primary Residential
Mortgage, Inc. (―PRMI‖) at its Franklin, Tennessee facility. The ―Branch Manager
Agreement‖ (the ―Employment Agreement‖) between Daliesso and PRMI outlined
Daliesso‘s responsibilities as branch manager, which included overseeing the day-today operations of the office and supervising all of the employees. The Employment
Agreement provided that Daliesso could not enter into binding contracts on behalf
of PRMI without the company‘s written consent. However, Daliesso authorized a
series of advertising contracts with BellSouth Advertising and Publishing
Corporation (―BellSouth‖) to market PRMI in the Nashville, Tennessee Yellow Pages
and an internet directory. Daliesso assured BellSouth‘s sales representative that he
had authority to bind PRMI to the advertising contracts, and BellSouth was unaware
of the Employment Agreement or of any restrictions on Daliesso‘s authority. PRMI
breeched the advertising contracts, and BellSouth sued PRMI for the remaining
balance and moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted BellSouth‘s
motion for summary judgment, holding that Daliesso had apparent authority to bind
PRMI to the advertising contracts. PRMI appealed solely on the ground that
Daliesso did not have actual authority to bind them to the contracts with BellSouth
pursuant to the terms of the Employment Agreement.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s ruling,
holding that (i) there was sufficient basis to conclude that BellSouth possessed a
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good-faith belief in Daliesso‘s apparent authority to bind PRMI to the advertising
contracts, and thus, (ii) PRMI was liable for the remaining balance. Apparent
authority may exist when a principal has not granted its agent actual authority, but
the principal‘s behavior—either intentionally or through carelessness—induces
detrimental reliance by a third party. Significantly, the principal‘s actions lead to
apparent authority, not the acts of the individual agent. In discussing this concept,
the court determined that three elements must be present to establish apparent
authority: ―(1) the principal either actually or negligently acquiesced in the agent‘s
exercise of authority; (2) the third party had knowledge of the fact and a good faith
belief that the agent possessed such authority; and (3) the third party detrimentally
relied on the apparent authority.‖
The court determined that the circumstances satisfied the first and third
elements. Regarding the first element, PRMI placed Daliesso in a position of
authority as branch manager of its Franklin, Tennessee office. Accordingly, PRMI
fostered the appearance that Daliesso had authority to manage the office and make
decisions that promoted the livelihood of the branch. Similarly, the court found that
the third element was satisfied because it was clear that BellSouth detrimentally relied
on Daliesso‘s apparent authority as branch manager
Regarding the second element, the court discussed several factors in finding
that BellSouth had a good faith belief in Daliesso‘s apparent authority to represent
PRMI. Initially, the court analyzed the facts to determine what authority PRMI had
actually conferred to Daliesso. The Employment Agreement established that
Daliesso had the authority to represent PRMI in a general fashion. Daliesso was
responsible for originating loans, completing credit and background checks on
prospective clients, and making personnel decisions within the branch. Relying on
the Tennessee Supreme Court‘s decision in O’Shea v. First Federal Savings & Loan
Ass’n, 405 S.W.2d 180 (Tenn. 1966), the court noted that when an agent‘s authority
and power is expressed in a limited scope, a third party is fully justified in implying
any authority which is reasonable and customary under similar circumstances. If the
principal has limited the general agent‘s authority, the principal is responsible for
disclosing the limitations to a third party because of the broad authority the title
encompasses. Although PRMI had contractually limited Daliesso‘s authority to enter
into contracts on its behalf, the record does not indicate that PRMI communicated
those limitations to BellSouth.
Although PRMI‘s actions gave rise to apparent authority, Daliesso‘s actions
and behavior still could have eliminated BellSouth‘s good-faith reliance on his
authorization. The court noted that if Daliesso had been apprehensive or skeptical
about approving the advertising contracts, then BellSouth would have lost the
requisite good faith belief necessary to satisfy the second element. Conversely, the
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court acknowledged that Daliesso explicitly and without hesitation affirmed to
BellSouth‘s sales representative that he had authority to approve the contracts.
Moreover, the circumstances did not reveal any motive or substantial benefit
evidencing that Daliesso stood to personally gain from the contracts, nor was
BellSouth aware of any such agenda.
The court also inquired into whether it was reasonable under the
circumstances for BellSouth to believe that Daliesso possessed the necessary
authority to enter into the advertising contracts. The contracts were presumably
intended to generate business for the mortgage office. Because the mortgage
business is usually oversaturated, firms typically rely heavily on advertising to
increase market share; thus, Daliesso‘s actions were intended to benefit PRMI. The
court found that BellSouth was reasonable in believing that that the manager of a
mortgage office would be authorized to enter into advertising contracts.
Ultimately, the court held that (i) Daliesso‘s position as branch manager made
Daliesso a general agent of PRMI; (ii) neither PRMI nor Daliesso expressed
limitations on Daliesso‘s authority; and (iii) Daliesso possessed the apparent authority
to bind PRMI to the advertising contracts.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals‘ decision in BellSouth v. Primary Residential
Mortgage reinforces the agency law notion that to avoid liability for the unauthorized
acts of their general agents, principals must notify third parties of limitations to the
agents‘ authority. A contract between a principal and agent that limits the agent‘s
authority will not necessarily shield the principal from liability if the agent exceeds
that authority. Although an employment contract is an important step in limiting an
agent‘s authority, attorneys should advise business entities that additional measures
should be taken to expressly notify third parties of the limits on their employees‘
authority.
―――――
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When an employer’s only liability is based on actions of a “nonparty
employee,” the employer cannot be held vicariously liable after the statute of
repose has run against that “nonparty employee.” Huber v. Marlow, No.
E2007-01879-COA-R9-CV, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 395, 2008 WL 2199827
(Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2008).
By Natasha W. Campbell, Esq.
The doctrine of respondeat superior subjects employers to liability for the
negligent acts of employees. However, the Tennessee Court of Appeals recently
held in Huber v. Marlow that where an employer‘s only liability rests on the actions of
a ―nonparty employee,‖ the employer cannot be held vicariously liable after the
statute of repose has run against that employee.
Elizabeth Chenoweth was treated by Dr. Douglas Marlow and Dr. David
Rankin at Baptist Hospital of East Tennessee. While under Dr. Rankin‘s care, Ms.
Chenoweth fell down and sustained a head injury which caused an intracranial
hemorrhage. Ms. Chenoweth underwent surgery to relieve pressure caused by the
hemorrhage, but died two days later.
In a subsequent malpractice action brought by Ms. Chenoweth‘s daughters,
Internists of Knoxville, PLLC—the employer of Dr. Marlow and Dr. Rankin—
argued that it could not be held liable under respondeat superior because Dr. Rankin had
not been sued within the three-year statute of repose. The trial court granted
summary judgment, and Plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, the court restated the premise that a principal may not be held
vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its agent ―(1) when the agent has been
exonerated by an adjudication of non-liability, (2) when the right of action against the agent
is extinguished by operation of law, or (3) when the injured party extinguishes the agent‘s
liability . . . .‖1 The Huber court found the second circumstance present in this
case—i.e., that the right of action against the agent, Dr. Rankin, had run.
 Natasha W. Campbell is an Associate with the Knoxville office of Baker, Donelson, Bearman,
Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C. Natasha is a former Editor of both Transactions: The Tennessee Journal of
Business Law and the Tennessee Law Review. She can be reached at (865) 549-7000 or at
ncampbell@bakerdonelson.com.
Huber, 2008 WL 2199827 at *3 (quoting Johnson v. LeBonheur Children‘s Med. Ctr., 74 S.W3d 338,
345 (Tenn. 2002)).
1
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Statutes of repose extinguish the right to sue. Thus, because the medical
malpractice statute of repose had run while the litigation was pending against Dr.
Rankin, the court stated that the harm was ―damnum absque injuria—a wrong for
which the law allows no redress.‖ The court thus affirmed partial summary
judgment in favor of Internists of Knoxville.
The court‘s decision in Huber v. Marlow may affect litigation far outside the
context of medical malpractice actions because the doctrine of respondeat superior is
not limited to the healthcare setting. In Tennessee, ―[a]n employer is liable for the
negligent acts of an employee if the employee is on the employer's business and
acting within the scope of his employment at the time the negligent act occurs.‖2
Tennessee attorneys should be mindful that under Huber v. Marlow, lawsuits brought
against an employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior must be filed within the
statute of repose applicable to the tortious employee.
PATENT LAW
Patent infringement does not automatically justify injunctive relief; rather, a
patent holder that requests a permanent injunction must satisfy the
traditional four-factor test. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
By James Cline
In a patent infringement action, the district court may award permanent
injunctive relief to the patent holder. Traditionally, a federal court may grant such
relief only after a patent holder has demonstrated:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by
a permanent injunction.
In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the United States Supreme Court held that
Craig v. Gentry, 792 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990)(citation omitted); see Parker v. Vanderbilt
Univ., 767 S.W.2d 412, 416 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (―To hold the master/principal liable, it must be
established ‗that the servant or agent shall have been on the superior's business, acting within the
scope of his employment.‘‖) (quoting Nat‘l Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 162 S.W.2d 501,
504 (Tenn. 1942)).
2
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district courts must apply this general ―four-factor test‖ to disputes arising under the
Patent Act and thus, an injunction does not automatically follow a finding of patent
infringement.
MercExchange, L.L.C., held a business method patent for an electronic
marketplace operated by a trustworthy, central authority and structured to facilitate
the exchange of goods between private buyers and sellers. The technology company
attempted to license its patent to eBay Inc. and Half.com, Inc., both of which
operated websites that displayed listings of goods for sale by private sellers.
Negotiations failed, and the websites continued business as usual.
MercExchange filed suit against eBay and Half.com in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging patent infringement. A
jury found that MercExchange‘s business method patent was valid and had been
infringed by eBay and Half.com. The district court awarded damages but denied the
patent holder‘s motion for permanent injunctive relief. In supporting its decision,
the court found that MercExchange would not suffer an irreparable injury if an
injunction was not awarded. The district court reached this conclusion based on
MercExchange‘s ―willingness to license its patents‖ and ―its lack of commercial
activity in practicing the patents.‖
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
reversed in part, holding that the district court had abused its discretion by not
awarding permanent injunctive relief. The Federal Circuit relied on its ―general rule
that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent
exceptional circumstances.‖ Finding the district court‘s analysis unpersuasive, the
Federal Circuit saw no reason to depart from this standard practice.
The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Federal
Circuit, holding that both lower courts had failed to properly apply equitable
principles. Specifically, the Court held that the traditional four-factor test for
permanent injunctive relief must be applied to disputes arising under the Patent Act.
The district court erred by denying injunctive relief based on the patent holder‘s
desire to license its patent and its decision not to commercially practice the
invention. Such broad classifications avoid the detailed analysis required by the
principles of equity. The Federal Circuit erred by applying its ―general rule‖ for
permanent injunctions and ignoring the traditional equitable principles altogether.
Consequently, the Supreme Court remanded so that the district court may correctly
apply the four-factor test in determining whether permanent injunctive relief is
appropriate.
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In reaching its decision, the United States Supreme Court relied on ―wellestablished principles of equity.‖ The Court noted that a significant departure from
these principles should not be merely implied by the courts. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court reasoned that absent clear congressional intent to the contrary, the
general four-factor test applies to disputes arising under the Patent Act. The Act
contains no indication that Congress intended to create a unique rule governing
permanent injunctions in patent disputes. Moreover, the Patent Act states that
courts ―may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent
the violation of any right secured by patent . . . .‖ Therefore, the Federal Circuit‘s
―general rule‖ for permanent injunctions has no apparent statutory basis in the Act,
and the traditional four-factor test applies to disputes arising under the Act.
The Supreme Court‘s comparison of patents and copyrights lends further
support for the application of the four-factor test to patent disputes. Both patents
and copyrights, as defined by their respective acts, are forms of personal property.
As such, patent holders and copyright holders possess the ―right to exclude others‖
from interfering with their property. Both the Patent Act and the Copyright Act
state that courts may award injunctive relief according to traditional equitable
principles when that right has been violated. Thus, mirroring its past treatment of
injunctions under the Copyright Act, the Supreme Court held that the four-factor
test similarly applies to disputes arising under the Patent Act.
The eBay decision marks an end to the longstanding presumption that a permanent
injunction automatically follows a finding of patent infringement. The Supreme
Court‘s unanimous ruling makes it clear that injunctions in patent disputes will be
more difficult to obtain under the traditional four-factor test. The two concurring
opinions, however, suggest that the application of the test is somewhat uncertain in
the context of modern patent enforcement. After eBay, the possibility of obtaining a
permanent injunction remains, but the likelihood of doing so has been significantly
reduced. Patent holders, alleged infringers, and the attorneys who represent them
must understand the practical effects of eBay and plan their patent strategies
accordingly.
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PROPERTY LAW
Prescriptive easements provide individuals the legal right to use a route that is
not a public road and that they have not claimed by adverse possession. Gore
v. Stout, No. M2006-02111-COA-R3-CV, 2008 Tenn. App. Lexis 85, 2008 WL 450597
(Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2008).
By Kevin Hartley
In Gore v. Stout, the Tennessee Court of Appeals analyzed the elements
necessary for the creation of a public road by implication and the elements needed
to establish a prescriptive easement. The court also addressed the difference
between a prescriptive easement and the acquisition of property by adverse
possession. In doing so, the court held that creation of a public road necessitates
dedication by public use. The court also stated that a party may tack on the adverse
use of land under a predecessor‘s title to meet the twenty-year period necessary to
establish a prescriptive easement. Moreover, the court explained that adverse
possession differs from a prescriptive easement in that adverse possession is asserted
to acquire title in or possession of land while a prescriptive easement is claimed for
the right to use land.
In 1980, Jon Johnson purchased land in Putnam County, Tennessee, where
he and his friend, Willard Gore, spent time hunting. To access this property,
Johnson often used a route that crossed land owned by Tony Stout. In 1996, Gore
purchased a piece of this land from Johnson. Because the land was not easily
accessible, Gore accessed the property via the route across Stout‘s land. Gore had
used this route from 1980 through 1996 on his hunting trips with Johnson, and he
continued to use the route from his purchase of the land in 1996 until July 2001. In
July 2001, Stout confronted Gore about his use of the route. In 2003, Stout
informed Gore that he planned to block the route leading across his land to Gore‘s
land, an act that would essentially prevent Gore from accessing his land.
Gore filed suit in an attempt to preserve access to the route across Stout‘s
property. The trial court ruled that the route was a public road by implication, that
Gore had a prescriptive easement to use it, and that Gore had an easement by
adverse possession. Stout appealed.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the route was not a
public road by implication. To create a public road by implication (i) the landowner
must express an intent to dedicate the road to the public and (ii) the public must
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either expressly or impliedly accept the road. The court determined that the
evidence presented by Gore did not establish Stout‘s intention to dedicate the route
to public use. Thus, the court reversed the trial court and held that the route was not
a public road by implication.
Additionally, the court ruled that Gore did not have a right to use the route
as a result of adverse possession. The court reasoned that an easement is not an
interest in the ownership of real property, but a claim for the use of property.
Further, the court recognized a difference between the exercise of possession and
amount of control necessary to establish adverse possession and the continuous use
element of a prescriptive easement. Thus, the court also reversed the trial court‘s
holding that Gore had the right to use the route based on adverse possession.
However, the court affirmed the trial court‘s ruling that Gore acquired a
prescriptive easement to use the route crossing Stout‘s land. Under Tennessee law,
the creation of a prescriptive easement occurs when ―the use and enjoyment of the
property [is] adverse, under a claim of right, continuous, uninterrupted, open, visible,
exclusive, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner of the servient
tenement, and [ ] continue[s] for the full prescriptive period.‖ In making its
determination, the court addressed three issues: (1) whether use of the route had
occurred for the full prescriptive period; (2) whether Gore‘s possession was adverse,
hostile, and under a claim of right; and (3) whether use of the route had been
sufficiently continuous.
The first issue was whether Gore could add Johnson‘s prior adverse use of
the route onto his adverse use to satisfy the required twenty-year period. The court
held that Gore could do so. Tennessee law allows a buyer to use parol evidence to
prove that he or she reasonably relied on representations made by the seller that the
transfer of land includes the right to use property that the seller previously used
adversely. The court reasoned that because the route across Stout‘s land represented
the only reasonable way for Gore to access his property, he and Johnson understood
that when he purchased the land he would retain a right to use the route.
The second issue was whether Gore‘s possession had been adverse, hostile,
and under a claim of right. The court reasoned that Gore adversely used the route
because he had neither requested nor received permission to use the route. Further,
the court found it persuasive that Gore or Johnson maintained the route and used it
regularly and visibly for twenty-three years with no objection by Stout. The court
deemed this use sufficient to put Stout on notice that Gore and Johnson asserted a
hostile claim on his land. As such, the court stated that if Stout wanted to prevent
Gore from attaining a prescriptive easement over the route, he should have objected
to Gore‘s use at an earlier time.
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The third and final issue the court addressed was whether Gore‘s use of the
route was continuous. Stout conceded that Gore‘s use since 1996 was continuous;
thus, the court only needed to determine whether Johnson‘s use from 1980-1996 had
been continuous. The court stated that determinations of continuous use must be
based on the unique circumstance of each case. The court held that even though the
frequency of Johnson‘s use fluctuated, the use was continuous given the
circumstances of the case.
Based on its determination of these three issues, the court affirmed the trial
court‘s holding that Gore had a prescriptive easement to use the route crossing
Stout‘s land. In view of Gore v. Stout, landowners should remain vigilant of hostile
claims to their land. Lawyers should advise landowners to object to hostile claims
against their land in a timely manner to prevent the claim from rising to the level of a
prescriptive easement. If landowners do not object to such hostile claims, they may
forfeit their right to control access to their land.
TAX LAW
Because ordinary investment advisory fees incurred by a trust or estate are
also commonly incurred by individuals, such fees are only tax deductible to
the extent that they exceed 2% of the adjusted gross income, as mandated in
§ 67(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. Knight v. Comm’r, 128 S. Ct. 782 (2008).
By Jennifer Simons
Investment advisory fees are considered ―miscellaneous itemized
deductions‖ under I.R.C. § 67(a) and are deductible only to the extent that they
exceed 2% of the adjusted gross income (the ―2% floor‖). Under § 67(e)(1), costs
incurred in the administration of trusts or estates are not subject to the 2% floor. In
Knight v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court addressed whether investment advisory fees
incurred by a trust or estate are subject to the 2% floor of § 67(a) or exempt as
administrative costs under § 67(e)(1). The Court held that investment advisory fees
incurred by a trust or estate are subject to the 2% floor if they are fees for advisory
services commonly rendered to individuals; but that additional advisory fees specific
to fiduciary accounts may be fully deductible as administrative costs.
Michael Knight, trustee of the William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust (the
―Trust‖), hired Warfield Associates, Inc., an investment advisory firm, in 2000 to
advise him concerning investing the assets of the Trust. The Trust, which held
approximately $2.9 million in marketable securities at the beginning of the tax year,
paid Warfield Associates $22,241 for the services. On its 2000 income tax filing, the
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Trust reported an income of $624,816 and deducted the full amount of Warfield
Associates‘ advisory fees. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue conducted an
audit and found that the fees were subject to the 2% floor, resulting in a tax
deficiency of $4,448.
The Trust petitioned the United States Tax Court, arguing that a trustee‘s
duty to act as a ―prudent investor‖ under the Uniform Prudent Investor Act requires
the trustee to obtain investment advisory services, and such fees are therefore unique
to trusts and fully deductible. The Tax Court rejected this argument and ruled in
favor of the Commissioner, holding that such fees are subject to the 2% floor
because full deduction under § 67(e)(1) applies only to expenses that are uncommon
outside the area of trusts. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court‘s
decision, holding that costs are fully deductible only if individuals are ―incapable‖ of
incurring them. The Trust appealed the Second Circuit‘s decision to the United
States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the investment advisory fees
incurred by the Trust were subject to the 2% floor because they were fees for the
same type of services commonly obtained by individuals and that Warfield
Associates had not charged fees for any special fiduciary services that were subject to
the § 67(e)(1) exemption. However, the Supreme Court determined that the test for
deciding whether expenses are fully deductible is not whether such costs are
―incapable‖ of being incurred by individuals, but instead whether they are
―commonly‖ or ―customarily‖ incurred by individuals. In adopting this test, the
Court looked primarily to the language of the statute.
I.R.C. § 67(e)(1) states that the exemption from the 2% floor applies only to
costs incurred in the administration of an estate or trust ―which would not have
been incurred if the property were not held in such trust.‖ The Court rejected the
Trust‘s interpretation of the statute as a causation test of whether the cost was
incurred due to the property being held in trust, noting that such interpretation
would allow full deduction of all costs incurred by a trust. The Court also found
that the question is not whether an individual could have incurred the cost, as stated
by the Second Circuit, because Congress used the word ―would‖ instead of ―could‖
in the statute. After closely examining the statutory language, the Court found that
the best interpretation of the statute was the test previously adopted by the Fourth
and Federal Circuits: ―Costs incurred by trusts that escape the 2% floor are those
that would not ‗commonly‘ or ‗customarily‘ be incurred by individuals.‖
Individual taxpayers commonly hire investment advisers and incur their fees.
As such, the Court concluded that the fees incurred by the Trust in this case do not
qualify for exemption from the 2% floor of § 67(a). If Warfield Associates had
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charged a special additional fee for fiduciary-related advisement, such a fee would be
fully deductible under § 67(e)(1). However, the record in Knight v. Commissioner
indicated that the fees charged by Warfield Associates were for common investment
advisory services—not for fiduciary-specific services. The Court also noted that a
trust with an unusual financial objective or abnormal circumstances could require
expert advice, and that the incremental cost of such advice beyond the cost of
ordinary services offered to individuals would be exempt from the 2% floor of
§ 67(a).
Prior to the Supreme Court‘s decision in Knight v. Commissioner, the Federal
Circuit Courts were divided on this issue, with the Sixth Circuit holding in 1993 that
investment advisory fees incurred by trusts and estates are fully deductible. Knight v.
Commissioner overturns the Sixth Circuit‘s 1993 ruling and settles the discrepancy,
while also providing statutory interpretation and a test for determining which costs
are deductible. The case also spells out a loophole for trusts, providing that the 2%
floor of § 67(a) of the Internal Revenue Code can be avoided by obtaining fiduciaryspecific investment advisory services. The Court complicates the loophole, however,
by indicating that fees for specialized services will only be fully deductible in the
amount that they exceed ―what would normally be required for the ordinary
taxpayer.‖
―――――
In evaluating the reasonableness of treasury regulations, Third Circuit
Federal Courts will apply the Supreme Court’s deferential Chevron analysis
rather than its stringent National Muffler analysis. Swallows Holding, Ltd. v.
Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008).
By Jennifer Neal
When a statute is ambiguous, the court must determine whether an agency‘s
regulations are reasonable in light of the statutory language. The United States
Supreme Court developed tests in both National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States,
440 U.S. 472 (1979), and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984), to determine whether federal administrative agency rules and
regulations are reasonable in light of their enabling statute. However, the Court has
not resolved apparent discrepancies between the two tests. In Swallows Holding, Ltd.
v. Commissioner, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit confronted
inconsistencies inherent in the tests and adopted the Chevron deference for agency
regulations.
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Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Commissioner involved a Barbados corporation
(―Swallows Holding‖) that owned rental property in San Diego from 1993-1996 but
neglected to file United States tax returns for the relevant tax periods until 1999.
When Swallows Holding filed its tax returns for 1993- 1996, the corporation claimed
deductions for real property activities. The statute allowing business expense
deductions for real property activities was silent as to time limitations but included
the term ―manner.‖ In a treasury regulation, the Secretary of the Treasury
proscribed that returns falling under the statute must be filed within eighteen months
or the deductions would be disallowed. Treas. Reg. 1.882-4(a)(3)(i). Because
Swallows Holding failed to file its tax return within eighteen months of the due date,
the Commissioner assessed tax deficiencies for 1994-1996.
Following the assessment, Swallows Holding filed suit in the United States
Tax Court. The Tax Court determined that the Supreme Court did not intend for
Chevron to supplant National Muffler. Therefore, the court considered the six-part
inquiry from National Muffler and concluded that the treasury regulation was
unreasonable. Because Congress failed to include the term ―time‖ in the statute in
question, the court looked to similar statutes involving ―manner‖ that also included
―time.‖ The court concluded that the legislature included the term ―time‖ in statutes
where it intended the term to apply. Therefore, the court found the statute
unambiguous on its face but nonetheless applied the National Muffler test.
In its analysis, the Tax Court determined that National Muffler and Chevron
involved the same essential inquiry. National Muffler involved a six-part test which
required the court to consider the following:
(1) whether the regulation is a substantially contemporaneous
construction of the statute by those presumed to have been aware of
congressional intent; (2) the manner in which a regulation dating
from a later period evolved; (3) the length of time that the regulation
has been in effect; (4) the reliance placed upon the regulation; (5) the
consistency of the Secretary‘s interpretations; and (6) the degree of
scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent
reenactments of this statute.3
Because the regulation failed several parts of the National Muffler test, the Tax Court
concluded that the regulation was an unreasonable exercise of power and ruled in
favor of Swallows Holding.
Swallows Holding, 515 F.3d at 166 (citing Nat‘l Muffler Dealers Ass‘n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472
(1979)).
3
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The Court of Appeals considered whether the Tax Court erred in concluding
that Chevron and National Muffler produced the same result. Essentially, the Chevron
analysis involved a two-part inquiry that affords federal agencies broad discretion
when the statute is ambiguous. Under the first prong of Chevron, the court must
determine whether a statute is ambiguous. Under the second prong, the court
considers whether the agency‘s interpretation is a ―permissible construction‖ of the
statute; the interpretation does not have to be the only interpretation or the
interpretation the court would have selected if confronted with the question.
Ambiguities within statutes are considered ―implicit congressional delegation‖ of
authority. If the court determines that the statute is unambiguous, then the court
never considers the second prong of the test; the agency‘s actions are deemed
unreasonable and an impermissible exercise of authority.
To determine whether the statute in Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Commissioner was
ambiguous, the court considered the fact that other courts had ―struggled over
whether ‗manner‘ include[d] a timing element.‖ Additionally, other sections of the
code involving the term ―manner‖ lacked the term ―time.‖ In some instances, the
statutes were interpreted to imply a time element, but in other instances, the court
reached the opposite conclusion. Consequently, the statute contained ambiguities,
requiring the court to consider the second prong of Chevron.
Regarding the second prong of Chevron, the court confronted several
inconsistencies in the National Muffler and Chevron tests. The Court of Appeals found
that the Tax Court relied heavily on factors that were not dispositive or mandatory
under Chevron; therefore, it conducted its own analysis of the Chevron factors.
Applying the second prong of Chevron to the facts of the case, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the treasury regulation was a reasonable, permissible construction of
the enabling statute. Chevron deference becomes more appropriate in cases involving
complex areas of the law, and tax law undoubtedly falls within the category. Because
the regulation allowed a reasonable timeline for filing a tax return and the treasury
regulation was a valid exercise of the Secretary‘s rule-making authority, the Third
Circuit vacated the Tax Court‘s order and remanded the case.
The decision in Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Commissioner clarifies that courts in
the Third Circuit will defer to a federal agency‘s rules when a statute is ambiguous as
long as the agency‘s interpretation is reasonable. Such a result implies that treasury
regulations and similar administrative rules will carry greater weight in the future
unless they are clearly inconsistent with their enabling statutes. In light of Swallows
Holding, Ltd. v. Commissioner, attorneys challenging federal administrative rules or
regulations should be aware that a court will not invalidate regulations simply
because the court would have interpreted the statute differently.

